Congestion Games Revisited

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Strategic games are considered where the players derive their utilities from participation in certain 'processes.' Two subclasses consisting exclusively of potential games are singled out. In the first, players choose where to participate, but there is a unique way of participation, the same for all players. In the second, the participation structure is fixed, but each player may have an arbitrary set of strategies. In both cases, the players sum up the intermediate utilities; thus the first class essentially coincides with that of congestion games. The necessity of additivity in either case is proven.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Potential games; Congestion games; Additive aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-12-22, Revised 2006-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26
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Related works:
Journal Article: Congestion games revisited (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412010

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