The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions

Juan Vidal-Puga

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We introduce a non-cooperative model of bargaining when players are divided into coalitions. The model is a modification of the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (Economic Theory, 2005) so that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own 'right to talk' when joining a coalition. We apply this model to an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Tamimi and Yannelis (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003) and show that the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be disadvantageous) disappears.

Keywords: cooperative; games; bargaining; coalition; structure; Harsanyi; paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2005-01-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501005

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