Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model

Julian J. Arevalo
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Julian J. Arevalo: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article proposes a method for considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as being path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long-term results for bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application for the model.

Keywords: Game theory; Bargaining; Path-Dependent Processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-02-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22. Game theory, Bargaining, Path-Dependent Processes
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0502004

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