Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity in Majoritarian Bargaining
Maria Montero ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division inside the coalition that forms in majoritarian bargaining games.
Keywords: noncooperative bargaining; majority games; inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 4
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0505007
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