Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation

Michael Rauh (mtrauh@indiana.edu) and Giulio Seccia
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Giulio Seccia: University of Southampton

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Keywords: Anxiety; principal-agent; incentives; monitoring; motivation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-06-29
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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