Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency
Mehmet Bac and
Serkan Küçükşenel ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We introduce ex-ante collusion whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in addition to ex-post collusion following the monitoring outcome. Extending a well-known model of hierarchy, we study the determinants of ex-ante collusion and show that, depending on the parameter values we identify, the principal can ignore either ex-post or ex-ante collusion.
Keywords: hierarchy; incentives; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().