Market Power Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems

Rafael Kelman, Luiz Barroso () and Mario Pereira
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Rafael Kelman: PSR
Mario Pereira: PSR

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid- based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power is simulated with a single stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme. The decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Thereafter, mitigation measures, specially bilateral contracts, are investigated. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented and discussed.

Keywords: Game theory; Hydroelectric-thermal power generation; Power generation economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2005-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508009

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