A sufficient condition for all-or-nothing information supply in price discrimination
Marco LiCalzi ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper provides a sufficient condition under which the optimal policy of a monopolistic seller who is considering the tradeoff between price discrimination and information disclosure is at one of two extremes: either buyers are given access to all the available information, or the seller makes no disclosure at all.
Keywords: Comparative statics; supermodular functions; lattice programming. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 15. Appeared in: Rendiconti per gli Studi Economici e Quantitativi, 2005, 163–177.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510005
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