Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games

John Conlon

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Suppose Player A is playing two apparently independent repeated games with two other people, B and C, with A randomly matched, each period, with either B or C. Each dyad maintains the maximum incentive-compatible level of cooperation within the dyad, even if cooperation has broken down in the other dyad. Thus, if A defects against B, say, then C is still willing to cooperate with A to the maximum incentive-compatible degree. Nevertheless, we show that the simple presence of each cooperative relationship can increase the maximum incentive compatible level of cooperation in the other dyad, due to a counterintuitive circular reasoning or “bootstrapping” effect. With more than two relationships, bootstrapping effects alternate with equally counterintuitive reverse bootstrapping effects.

Keywords: Repeated Games; Random Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2005-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511004

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