Demand commitment in legislative bargaining
Maria Montero () and
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Morelli (American Political Science Review, 1999) provides a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the homogeneous representation of the game. We provide a counterexample and prove a weaker result: proportional payoffs hold if the rules are modified so that the parties must move in decreasing order of weight.
Keywords: demand; commitment; majority; games; politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-reg
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 45
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Journal Article: Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511005
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