A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure
Balbina Casas- Méndez,
Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro and
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Balbina Casas- Méndez: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.
Keywords: coalition; structure; bargaining; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511006
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