Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents
Somdeb Lahiri ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.
Keywords: profit maximization; market equilibrium; manipulation via endowments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511008
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