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Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents

Somdeb Lahiri ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

Keywords: profit maximization; market equilibrium; manipulation via endowments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-25
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14.
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