Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

Maria Montero

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.

Keywords: altruism; spite; bargaining; competition; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2005-12-18
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512004

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