The Evolution of Obedience Norms in the Repeated Carrot-and-the Stick Game

Chong Lim Kim and Yong-Gwan Kim
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Chong Lim Kim: Department of Political Science
Yong-Gwan Kim: Economics

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Reciprocity norm in the U.S. Congress and state assemblies has been studied extensively. By contrast, obedience norms frequently observed in many legislative bodies outside the United States have received relatively little attention. We seek to provide an evolutionary account of obedience norms. Drawing on a detailed observation of the legislative game in the Korean National Assembly, we model it as the repeated carrot-and- the-stick game. The results show that obedience is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1993-11-01
Note: Zipped using PKZIP v2.04, encoded using UUENCODE v5.15. Zipped file includes 1 file -- legis3 (body in WP5.1, 35 pages);
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