Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies

Vijay Krishna and Robert Rosenthal

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio frequency spec trum, we consider situations where multiple objects are auctioned simultaneousl y by means of a second-price, sealed-bid auction. For some buyers, called globa l bidders, the value of multiple objects exceeds the sum of the objects' values separately. Others, called local bidders, are interested in only one object. I n a simple independent private values setting, we (a) characterize an equilibri um that is symmetric among the global bidders; (b) show that the addition of bi dders often leads to less aggressive bidding; and (c) compare the revenues obta ined from the simultaneous auction to those from its sequential counterpart.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1995-03-13
Note: 32 pages, Figures are not included and may be obtained by FAX by send ing an e-mail message to either author.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1996)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995)
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