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On the Finiteness of Stable Sets

John Hillas, Dries Vermeulen and Mathijs Jansen
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John Hillas: SUNY at Stony Brook

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: For two person games, stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens and quasi-stable sets in the sense of Hillas are finite. In this paper we present an example to show that these sets are not necessarily finite in games with more than two players.

Keywords: stable sets; Kohlberg and Mertens stability; quasi-stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05-23, Revised 1996-06-20
Note: Type of Document - AMS LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript (or almost anything else if you can process the dvi file);
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