Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium

John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg
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John Hillas: SUNY at Stony Brook
Elon Kohlberg: Harvard

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The central concept of noncooperative game theory is that of the \emph{strategic equilibrium} (or Nash equilibrium, or noncooperative equilibrium). In this chapter we discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding this concept and its refinements. Many of these issues have received increasing attention in the last few years. We are not at all comprehensive in covering the approaches that have been taken to the question. In particular, we focus almost exclusively on the ``purely rational'' approach and say almost nothing about other approaches. We do survey some of the issues and approaches that do not fit neatly into the core of our argument in the final section.

Keywords: strategic equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; strategic stability; equilibrium refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 2 pages
Date: 1996-06-30, Revised 1996-09-18
Note: Type of Document - AMS LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - emTEX ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 2 + 63; figures: included . Prepared for the \emph{Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications} edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart. Comments still welcomed by the authors, perhaps not by the editors. Postscript file redone embedding type 1 versions of the fonts, in the hope that a dpf file will be generated and the postsctipt file made directly available.
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