Looking Backwards, Looking Inwards: Priors and Introspection

Dov Samet

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The three notions studied here are Bayesian priors, invariant priors and introspection. A prior for an agent is Bayesian, if it agrees with the agent's posterior beliefs when conditioned on them. A prior is invariant, if it is the average, with respect to itself, of the posterior beliefs. Finally, an agent is introspective, if he is certain of his own beliefs. We show that a prior is Bayesian, if and only if it is invariant, and the agent is almost surely introspective. We show how to edogenize priors, and how to express the events that an agent has a Bayesian or invariant prior. Finally, we study properties of the endogenized common prior.

Keywords: Bayesian model; prior; common prior; type spaces; introspection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1996-10-15
Note: Type of Document - Postscript ; prepared on Unix; pages: 13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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