Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

Barton Lipman ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. More precisely, given any model where priors have the same support and any finite $N$, there is another model with common priors which has the same $n^{\rm th}$ order beliefs for all $n\ne N$.

Keywords: common; priors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Finite Order Implications of Common Priors (2003)
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