A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: "regret-matching." In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedure guarantees that, with probability one, the empirical distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-03-24, Revised 1997-11-25
Note: January 1997. Revised: October 1997. Paper + 3 figures (postscript). Also available at URL below
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Chapter: A SIMPLE ADAPTIVE PROCEDURE LEADING TO CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM (2013)
Working Paper: A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2010)
Journal Article: A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)
Working Paper: A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703006

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