Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning

Matthew Jackson, Ehud Kalai and Rann Smorodinsky
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Rann Smorodinsky: Technion

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Bayesian Statisticians, decision theorists, and game theorists often use Bayesian representations to describe the probability distribution governing the evolution of a stochastic process. Generally, however, one given distribution has infinitely many different Bayesian representations. This paper identifies natural, endogenous representations whose component distributions are learnable and follow patterns. Any given distribution that satisfies an asymptotic mixing condition has a unique, up to an equivalence class, natural Bayesian representation which can be obtained by conditioning on the tail-field of the process. This result follows a parallel to de Finetti's theorem, but with exchangeability weakened to asymptotic mixing which admits many more applications.

Keywords: patterns; asymptotic mixing; types; Bayesian learning; stochastic processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997-11-25
Note: Type of Document - postscript; prepared on gateway e 3100; to print on postscript; pages: 27 ; figures: none. comments welcome
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711002

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