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Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets

S. Aiyagari and Stephen Williamson ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We construct a dynamic heterogeneous-agent model with random uninsurable endowments. Two allocation mechanisms are considered, one with long-term complete credit arrangements under private information, and one with incomplete competitive markets. A role for money arises due to random limited participation. A Friedman rule is optimal in the first economy, and replicates a pure credit arrangement in the second. Computational results show that steady state allocations are quite different under the two arrangements, though the responses to changes in long-run inflation are similar.

Keywords: 97-20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-02-04
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Acrobat PDF; pages: 43 ; figures: included
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Related works:
Working Paper: Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9802003

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