A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games
Alexander Tieman and
Harold Houba ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) when the latter model's (fixed) mutation rate is equal to the expected mutation rate. A small population result corrects a minor omission in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993).
Keywords: varying mutation rate; risk dominance; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - TeX (Scientific Workplace 2.5); prepared on COMPAQ PC; to print on HP Laserjet IV; pages: 14 ; figures: included
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809002
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