Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications
V Bhaskar and
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
This paper provides a theoretical foundation for Markov (perfect) equilibria in repeated games with asynchronous moves that is based on memory costs. We show that if players incur a ``complexity cost'' which depends on the memory length required by their strategies, then any rationalizable strategy is Markovian. Thus, every Nash or perfect equilibrium is Markovian as well. We also provide a dynamic learning rationale for this conclusion. Our result has interesting implications for repeated asynchronous choice games where the stage game is of common interest. If players are sufficiently patient, rationalizability ensures repeated play of the efficient stage-game equilibrium if this equilibrium satisfies a risk-related condition --- in 2x2 games risk- dominance is a sufficient condition.
Keywords: Markov Equilibrium; Bouded Memory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on any;
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809003
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().