Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty
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Mauricio Bugarin: University of Brasilia
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.
Keywords: Vote splitting; uncertainty; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public Choice
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001
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