Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
Hans Haller and
Roger Lagunoff ()
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Hans Haller: Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.
Keywords: stochastic games; Markov Perfect equilibria; genericity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1999-01-27, Revised 1999-06-03
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on Acrobat PDF Writer; pages: 25 ; figures: included.
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Journal Article: Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901003
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