Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction

Sergiu Hart

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Keywords: games in extensive form; games of perfect information; backward induction equilibrium; subgame-perfect equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary stability; mutation; selection; population games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-27, Revised 2000-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-ind
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v2.5 (LaTeX); First
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction (2002)
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