Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?

Roger Lagunoff and Akihiko Matsui ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.

Keywords: repeated games; asynchronously repeated games; renewal games; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06-03, Revised 1999-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? (2001)
Working Paper: Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9906001

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