Between Liberalism and Democracy

Dov Samet and David Schmeidler

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study a class of voting rules that bridge between majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. We characterize axiomatically a family of rules parameterized by the weight each individual has in determining his or her qualification. In one extreme case, the Liberal Rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In the other, an individual's qualification is determined by a majority. We also propose a formalization of self-determination, and apply it in a characterization of the Liberal Rule.

Keywords: liberalism; voting rules; social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999-08-10
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 19
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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9908/9908001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Between liberalism and democracy (2003)
Working Paper: Between LIberalism and Democracy (2000)
Working Paper: Between Liberalism and Democracy (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9908001

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