Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard

Radim Bohacek ()

GE, Growth, Math methods from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies a closed economy with a continuum of agents and moral hazard. Economic agents in the economy operate a stochastic production technology with capital and labor inputs in which the latter is private information. I characterize efficient allocations of capital, labor, and consumption in a stationary recursive equilibrium for a decentralized economy with component planners. Allocation and accumulation of capital are facilitated by a 'capital planner' who serves as a financial intermediary for the component planners. In equilibrium, private information lowers the equilibrium interest rate below agents' discount rate and I show that contrary to the private-information endowment economies, a moral-hazard productive economy can exhibit both endogenous lower and upper bounds on the stationary distribution of utility entitlements.

JEL-codes: C68 D31 D82 E10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2001-02-12
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 28 ; figures: included
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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/ge/papers/0012/0012001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0012001

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