The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel
Eliane Catilina and
Robert E. Wright
General Economics and Teaching from University Library of Munich, Germany
Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two--players sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, ``cost of fighting,'' ``cost of shame'', and ``value of courage.''
Keywords: teaching; game theory; general economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pef; prepared on pc; pages: 14 ; figures: request from author
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0207001
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