"Approval Voting" lacks a sound moral base for the individual voter's choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected

Thomas Colignatus ()

General Economics and Teaching from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: "Approval Voting" is the voting mechanism reportedly used since 1987 by professional and scientific societies such as the Econometric Society, INFORMS, ASA, AMS, MAA, IEEE and the Social Choice and Welfare Society. The method lacks a sound moral base for the choice by individual members between approval and non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected. Minority rights are better protected when every voter respects the uniform Status Quo, rather than allowing that every voter determines a private (secret) reference point. A better method than Approval Voting is the (Pareto-) Borda Fixed Point rule introduced in the literature in 2001.

JEL-codes: A00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2005-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: 9 pages pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0503014

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