The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality
Axel Dreher ()
International Finance from University Library of Munich, Germany
The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain changes in this conditionality over time as well as differences between the two institutions. Using panel data it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seem to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity. Moreover, the paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre- election years. Breakdowns of IMF programs are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper describes the institutions’ reaction to recent criticism and concludes with implications for reform.
Keywords: IMF; World Bank; Conditionality; Compliance; Program Interruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F33 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-lam
Note: Type of Document - ; prepared on PC; figures: included
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Working Paper: The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality (2002)
Working Paper: The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0207003
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