Policy Assessment of the European Central Bank and the Stability and Growth Pact’s Echo of the Conventional Wisdom on Budget Management
William Ginn ()
International Finance from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper provides an in-depth normative analysis in two parts: 1) ECB monetary policy focusing on credibility, accountability, transparency, flexibility, and both goal and instrument independence; 2) Theoretical analysis of discrepancies of the Stability and Growth Pact rules vs. discretionary framework that is comprised of the conventional view on budget deficits and how budget deficit targeting creates a procyclical and endogenous policy.
Keywords: Central Bank Credibility; Accountability; Flexibility; Ricardian Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 F4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Note: Type of Document - word doc; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP Deskjet Series; pages: 30; figures: Within Document
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0402004
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