Licensing under Asymmetric information

Arijit Mukherjee

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the result found on licensing under complete information. Further, we show that under incomplete information welfare could be higher than under complete information.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Licensing; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002-11-05
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Licensing under Asymmetric information (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211007

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