The Performance of German Motion Pictures, Profits, and
Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper discusses different mechanisms of subsidy allocation invoked by operation of law. We compare the allocation of subsidies via committees to the allocation of subsidies through the reference principle, which binds public support to performance at the box offce. The analysis is embedded in a broadly disposed regression analysis of the determinants of the performance of German movies in the theatrical market. It aims to identify market characteristics and contrasts the German case with studies that address foreign markets. Finally, the profitability of the industry is considered as the presumed economic non-viability of the industry constantly recurs in the public debate as an argument for subsidies.
Keywords: German movies; subsidies; motion picture industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L82 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-ind
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC; pages: 36
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0302002
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