Mediating Market Power in Electricity Networks

Richard Gilbert, Karsten Neuhoff () and David M Newbery

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We ask under what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power. We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial. In an efficiently arbitraged uniform price auction generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market power. However, if generators inherit transmission contracts or buy them in a 'pay-as-bid' auction, then these contracts can enhance market power. In the two-node network case banning generators from holding transmission contracts that do not correspond to delivery of their own energy mitigates market power. Meshed networks differ in important ways as constrained links no longer isolate prices in competitive markets from market manipulation. The paper suggests ways of minimizing market power considerations when designing transmission contracts.

JEL-codes: L1 L12 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: 36 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mediating Market Power in Electricity Networks (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303008

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