TV Advertising, Program Quality, and Product-Market Oligopoly
Tore Nilssen () and
Lars Sørgard ()
Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany
We present a model of the TV-advertising market that encompasses both the product markets and the market for TV programs. We argue that the TV industry has several idiosyncratic characteristics that need to be modeled, and show that the strategic interaction in this industry differs from other industries in many respects. We find that a move from a TV monopoly to a TV duopoly may reduce both the total number of viewers and the total amount of TV advertising. A softening of price competition in each product market results in more investment in program quality, higher price per advertising slot, and more advertising. A reduction of the number of firms in each product market may have the opposite effect if the price competition in the product market is sufficiently soft initially. Finally, we find that even small asymmetries between product markets can cause large asymmetries with respect to which producers buy advertising on TV.
JEL-codes: L82 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 2 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Working Paper: TV Advertising, Program Quality, and Product-Market Oligopoly (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303012
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