Little Firms and Big Patents: The Incentives To Disclose Competencies

Wolfgang Gick

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper offers a theoretical treatment of information disclosure through patenting. We consider a signaling model in which two domestic firms disclose their competencies to a foreign firm. Conditions are discussed under which separating and pooling equilibria occur, together with a domination-based re-finement. Depending on the payoff situation of the foreign firm, separating and semi-separating equilibria occur in which the firm with the higher competencies discloses. We show that subsidizing the costs of patent applications has no impact on the outcome.

Keywords: Patenting; Disclosure; R&D Cooperations; Asymmetric Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2004-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0411010

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