Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors
Yuanzhu Lu ()
Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany
Endogenous order of moves in quantity choice is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly with one public firm, n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice and find subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The main results are that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all domestic private firms and not to be a leader of all foreign private firms, and that the number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms and that of foreign private firms.
Keywords: Mixed Oligopoly; Endogenous Timing; Foreign Competitors; Public Firm; Private Firm, Simultaneous, Sequential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 C72 D43 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0508012
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