International Trade Policy towards Monopolies and Oligopolies
Praveen Kujal () and
Juan Ruiz ()
International Trade from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study the effect of market structure upon international trade policy when firms invest in process R&D before competing in a differentiated goods market. For a domestic monopoly, and increasing the number of foreign firms, the government either chooses a R&D (and output) subsidy, or remains inactive. For a domestic duopoly a government taxes, subsidizes, or does not promote R&D depending upon the number of domestic firms and the degree of product differentiation. R&D (and output) is taxed for high levels of product differentiation. For lower levels of product differentiation only one country may subsidize in equilibrium. Further, the results are robust to Cournot or Bertrand competition.
Keywords: Product Differentiation; Strategic Trade Policy; Policy Reversals; R&D subsidies; monopoly; duopoly. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-pke
Date: 2003-02-04, Revised 2003-03-24
Note: Type of Document - pdf file; prepared on Scientific Workplace; to print on any printer; pages: 20 ; figures: included in text
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0302002
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