Judicial Selection: Politics, Biases, and Constituency Demands

Thomas Stratmann and Gared Garner
Additional contact information
Gared Garner: University of Virginia

Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The determinants of recent U.S. district court judges and appellate court judges selection have been subject of much debate, but little systematic evidence has been presented to substantiate claims regarding discrimination against particular groups of judicial nominees, nor regarding the length of the appointment process. We study both the length of the nominations process, and the likelihood of confirmation and emphasize the role of Senatorial seniority and agenda control in the confirmations process. We find that Senators with agenda control have a positive effect on the speed and likelihood of confirmation and that nominees from states with comparatively senior Senators receive expedited treatment relative to other nominees. Although politics matter in the confirmation process, Senators are responsive to perceived “shortage” of judges, since they fill seats faster when a relatively large number of court seats are vacant. Nominees with higher personal qualifications are also more likely to experience success in confirmations. We found no evidence of gender or race discrimination on the part of the Senate.

Keywords: judicial selection; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2003-02-07, Revised 2003-03-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pke
Note: Type of Document - acrobat pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 31 ; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/0302/0302001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Judicial Selection: Politics, Biases, and Constituency Demands (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0302001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).