How to Improve Forensic Science
Roger Koppl ()
Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Some institutional structures for inquiry produce better approximations to truth than others. The current institutional structure of police forensics gives each lab a monopoly in the analysis of the police evidence it receives. Forensic workers have inadequate incentives to produce reliable analyses of police evidence. Competition would create such incentives. I outline a system of “competitive self regulation” for police forensics. Each jurisdiction would have several competing forensic labs. Evidence would be divided and sent to one, two, or three separate labs. Chance would determine which labs and how many would receive evidence to analyze. Competitive self regulation improves forensics by creating incentives for error detection and reducing incentives to produce biased analyses.
Keywords: forensics; forensic science; epistemics; DNA; fingerprints; vouchers; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: Type of Document - doc; pages: 62
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: How to Improve Forensic Science (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0503001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().