New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique
Law and Economics from EconWPA
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate two new anti-merger instruments, innovation markets and unilateral effects, on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s’ antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.
Keywords: antitrust; mergers; innovation markets; unilateral effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hpe, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20. This paper was published in Cato Journal, Winter 2001. Stable URL:
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0512003
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