The consequences of staggered wage setting for the credibility of monetary policy

Olga Arratibel and Jonathan Thomas
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Olga Arratibel: Banco Central Hispanoamericano Madrid

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper introduces staggered wage contracts a la Taylor (1979)into a standard model of monetary policy credibility. The overlapping wage structure is shown to considerably exacerbate the time consistent inflation rate in Markov perfect equilibrium. If the central bank can commit to its monetary policy for one-period ahead, this reduces but does not eliminate the inflationary bias. Even if it can commit for a length of time equal to the nominal contract length (i.e., two-periods), this does not generally lead to a zero inflation outcome, and may even lead to negative inflation if the central bank's rate of time discount is sufficiently high.

Keywords: staggered; wage; contracts; time; consistency; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2001-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM-PC; pages: 30 ; figures: included within document. 30 pages, PDF
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0103002

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