Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination
Bernd Hayo () and
Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this survey, we critically review the argument for central bank independence (CBI). We argue CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary stability. First, CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several. Second, CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable, but instead attention should be devoted to the question of why central banks are made independent. CBI is chosen by countries under specific circumstances, which are related to their legal, political, and economic systems. Third, in a number of empirical studies, researchers found CBI is correlated with low inflation rates. By taking the endogeneity of CBI into account, however, there is no reason to believe the correlation between CBI and low inflation tells us anything about causality.
Keywords: Central bank independence; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0103006
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