Is corporatism feasible?
Nicola Acocella and
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()
Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never find it profitable to co- operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.
Keywords: employment; inflation; trade unions; government; corporatism; policy game; feasibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E61 E31 E58 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP;
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Journal Article: IS CORPORATISM FEASIBLE? (2007)
Working Paper: Is corporatism feasible? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0301003
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