Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland’s Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany After the War

Jörg Bibow

Method and Hist of Econ Thought from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the (re-) establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on the ‘independence’ of the central bank, which, together with a ‘stability-orientation’ in monetary policy, proved a lasting German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to a widespread presumption, Ordoliberalism, the dominant contemporary force within the German economics profession widely held to have shaped the new economic order of West Germany called ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy), is found to have had no such impact on the country’s emerging monetary order at all. In fact, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and some key ideas underlying Ordoliberalism will be identified. Nor can an alternative – more Keynesian – policy regime and model of central bank independence that was developed in the mid 1950s by the Economic Advisory Council of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s famous first economics minister, claim any credit for the eventual legal status of the central bank that became enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957; a regime that subsequently remained untouched despite the (Keynesian) ‘Stability and Growth Act’ of 1967. It appears that, while contemporary economic theory had no decisive influence on the outcome, the central bank’s role as a political actor in its own right and in carving public opinion should not be underestimated in explaining a peculiar German tradition that was finally exported to Europe in the 1990s. Key words: central banking, central bank independence, Ordoliberalism, Keynesianism, monetarism JEL classifications: B22, B31, E50

Keywords: central banking; central bank independence; Ordoliberalism; Keynesianism; monetarism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B22 B31 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2004-05-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-his and nep-mon
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 37
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mhet/papers/0405/0405005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland's Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany After the War (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmh:0405005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Method and Hist of Econ Thought from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).