Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs
Eric Crampton ()
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
The distributive politics literature following Weingast (1979) predicts majoritarian redistribution within countries governed by strong party systems. This prediction is tested using evidence from Canadian job creation grant programs active during the mid-1990s. Results provide strong evidence against the hypothesis of majoritarian redistribution. Districts represented by the governing Liberal Party received lower grant allocations than did other districts, both absolutely and conditional on the unemployment variables on which allocation decisions were to have been made.
Keywords: majoritarian redistribution; distributive politics; public choice; Canada; HRDC; CJF; TJF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - PDF. This paper is under submission at Public Choice. I welcome comments and suggestions for improvement.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().