The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency

Matthew Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems conforms to the underlying distribution of preferences. We show that as the mechanism operates over a growing number decisions, the welfare costs of incentive constraints completely disappear. In addition, as the number of decisions being linked grows, a truthful strategy is increasingly successful and secures the efficient utility level for an agent.

Keywords: linking decisions; mechanism design; incentives; incentive compatibility; bundling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - ; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0303/0303007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency (2003)
Working Paper: The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0303007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).